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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JO·HN C. DAVIS, Attorney at Law,
for himself and all other duly
licensed and active practicing attorneys and counselors · at law,
similarly situated, within the State
of Utah,
PZavimtiIf,
vs.
OGDEN CITY, UTAH, a Municipal
Corporation, and CLYDE M. WEBBER, Ogden City Recorder,
Defendants.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

May it please the Court:
This proceeding involves the validity of a Business License Tax (Ordinance No. 307Y of the City of
Ogden.
Plaintiff, an attorney at law, practicing within the
State of Utah, for himself and all other duly licensed
and active pTacticing attorneys and counselors
at law,
l
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similarly situated, within the State of Utah, has ap•
plied for and there has issued herein out of this Court
an Alternative Writ of Prohibition, commanding the
City to refrain and desist from the enforcing of the
payment of the license tax imposed by said Ordinance,
against the plaintiff, until the further Order of this Court
thereon and praying t~at said Writ he made permanent.
To the petition of th·e plaintiff, defendants have
filed a general demurrer. There i~ thereby presented to
the Court a question of law, as to whether or not lawyers
may he subjected to the payment of the license tax required by the Ordinance before they may lawfully engage
in business, or in the practice of their profession, within
the corporate limits of Ogden City. In other words
there is presented to this Honorable Court for determination, the question of whether it is within the powers
granted and conferred upon Cities by the Legislature,
to pass a valid ordinance levying a r~evenue tax upon
members of the legal profession.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 15, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of
Ogden City, passed an Ordinance making it unlawful for
any person to engage in business within the corporate
limits of Ogden City, without first obtaining a Business
License as therein provided, or to violate any provision,
or fail to comply with all of the appropriate provisions
thereof; and providing that any violation or failure to
comply with any provision of said Ordinance should be
punishable as a misdemeanor as provided by the ordi-
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nanres of Ogden City.
The scale of ron1putation of the fees provided for
by said Ordinance is as follows:
Twenty (20) cents per
($1,000.00) of gross receipts.

One

Thousand

The minimum fee shall be Five Dollars
($5.00); the maximum fee shall be 'S~even Hundred Dollars ($700.00).
'

The license year under said Ordinance shall
be the calendar year.
The Ordinance in question contemplates the p~yment
of an annual license fee for the privilege of doing business within the cQrporate limits of the city and provides
that any license fees due and unpaid under the Ordinance and all penalties thereon shall constitute a debt
to Ogden City, and shall be collected by Court p·roceedings and in the same manner as any other debt in like
amount, which remedy shall he in addition to all. other
existing remedies.
Business as used in the Ordinance shall include all
activities engaged in or caused to be engaged in with
the object of gain or economic profit, but shall not include the acts of employees rendering service to employers.
The term doing business is defined by said Ordinance
as follows:
(a) Business as used in this ordinance shall
include all activities engaged in or caused to he
engaged in with the object of gain or econon1ic
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profit, but shall not include the acts of employes
rendering service to employers.
(b) The words engaging in business as used
herein shall specifically include, but not be limited
to, engaging in selling any tangible property
either at retail or wholesale, engaging in the manufacture of tangible property and selling the same
for retail, and the rendering of personal services
for others for a consideration by persons engaged
in any profession, trade, craft, business, occupation or other calling.
The annual license fee exacted hy said Ordinance is
based on ''gross. receipts''. The Ordinance expressly
provides that only receipts from that portion of the
business engaged in within the C?rporate limits of Ogden
City, shall he included in gross receipts and provides
that sales in inter-state commerce ar,e not licensed and
are not reportable under said Ordinance.
The O':rdinance in question was enacted for the express purpose of raising revenue with which to defray
the mountaing costs of city government. The much needed revenue is to be raised by levying a license fee or tax
upon those engaging in business within the City limits,
including the rendering of personal services for others
for a consideration by persons engaged in any profession, trade, craft, business, occupation or other calling.
This provision clearly places a part o_f the tax burden
on those persons who receive the benefits of city government, but some of whom, up to now, have paid no
part of the expense of upkeep of the City.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~)

It is not claimed in the petition filed herein that the
funds to be raised under the provisions of this Ordinance are for other than a public purpose or that the
City is not in dire need of the additional revenue which
• these licenses will produce. Under. our State Constitution (Article XI, Section 5, sub. (a) and state statutes
(Sections 15-8-39; 15-8-40; 15-8-80, Utah -Cotle ·Annotated, 1943) cities such as Ogden may raise revenue by
levying and collecting a license fee or tax on any business within- the limit of the city, and regulate tl1e same
by ordinance. (Sec. 15-8-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1943).
Nearly every city has a financial crisis. Operating cos,ts
are at a new high. Cities must cut services or ·find new
revenue sources. Intensive studies conducted by the city
officials of Ogden, indicated that the method employed
by the Ordinance in question was the only method that
would raise a sufficient amount of revenue to me,et the
needs and requirements of the City. It would appear
to be eminently fair and perhaps the fairest method
that could be ~evised, of requiring every citizen engaging
in business within the corporate limits of the city to
pitch in and carry his share of the load of the cost of
city government, including those engaged in the business
of ''rendering of peronal services for others for a consideration''.
The petition filed herein attacks the validity of the
Ordinance on six separate grounds. The six propositions
raised and discussed by the plain tiff will be referred to
herein in the same order as presented by the plaintiff.
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ARGUMENT
Under the general grant of powers to Cities of the
State of Utah; is the following:
15-8-80. License Fees and Taxes.
They may rais-e revenue by levying and collecting a license fee or tax on any business within
the limits of the city, and regulate the same by
ordinance; provided, that no Utah city or town
shall collect a license fee or tflJ( hereunder from
any solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains
orders for or sells goods in such city or town
solely for resale; and no enumeration of poweTs
of cities contained in title 15, chapter 8, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, shall be deemed to limit
or restrict'the general grant of authority hereby
conferred. All such license fees and taxes shall
be uniform in respect to the class upon which they
are imposed.
..
This is the statute which. now authorize's cities to
levy tax~s for r·evenue, along with 'Section 15-8-39, (License of Certain Business,es) Utah Code Annotated, 1943
and other incidental statutes covering specific matters.
The above quoted statute ( 1'5-8-80) was the authority
relied upon by the City in drafting the license 0Tdinance
under consideration. Therefore, the validity of the Ordinance will stem from the interpretation of the above
statute.

PROPOSITION NO. 1
The two cases, Ogden City vs. Boreman, 20 Utah
98, 57 Pac. 2d 843 and Morgan :vs. Salt Lake City, 78
Utah 403, 3 Pac. 2d 510, enter into a .quite thorough dis-
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russ1on of this statute. The legislative history of the
statute prior to 1935 and the changes therein are clearly
set forth in those tw'"o cases.
It appears that the original forerunner of the above
statute was Subdivision 87, Section 206, page 134, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898. The statute read as follows:
The city shall have the powerTo raise revenues by levying and collecting
a license fee or tax on any private corporation or
business within the limits of the city, and regUlate
the same by ordinance. All such license fees and
taxes shall be uniform in respect to the class upon
\vhich they are imposed.
At the same time th·e above quoted statute was in
force and effect, the following statute was also in force
and effect:
To license, tax, regulate, hawking, peddling,
pawn-brokerage, employment agencies, the keeping of ordinaries, theatrical and other exhibitions,
shows, and amusements, and the business conducted by ticket scalpers, distillers, brewers,
money-changers, brokers, keepers of public scales,
runner of stages, cars, public houses, or other
persons or things,. and to revoke such lieense at
pleasure; to license, tax, and regulate banks, bath
houses, livery stables, skating rinks, smelters,
crushers, express companies, restaurants, hotels,
taverns, theatres, opera houses, music halls,
boarding houses, eating houses, chop houses,
laundries, barber shops, second hand or junk
stores, and to forbid the owners or :persons in
•
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charge of said stores from purchasing or receiving any article whatever from minors without
the written consent of their guardian or parents;
to license, tax and regulate the business conducted
by hackmen, draymen, omnibus drivers, carters,
cabmen, porters, expressmen, watermen, and all
other persons pursuing like occupations and to
prescribe their compensation; to license, tax and
regulate the business conducted by merchants,
retailers, shop and shopkeepers, butchers, druggists, photographers, assayer, confectioners, and
fruit peddlers.
·subdivision 38, Sec. 206, p. 129, Revised Stat, utes, 1898.
In 1888, the first quoted statute, Subdivision 87,
Section 206, page 134, was included in the compilation
of that year. At the sam·e time, included in the compilation, was a statute specifically authorizing cities to tax
lawyers. The statute was cited as 1 Compiled Laws of
Utah, 1888, page 3.31, Section 288.
In 1898, when the R.evised Statutes of that year were
enacted, the Legislature deleted the specific authorization as to the licensing of lawyers. However, the other
two licensing and taxing statutes were retained substantially as above quoted.
It was with this background that Ogden City attempted to levy a licens~e tax upon a lawyer, based on
the claim that the first quoted statute, Subdivision 38,
Section 206 (the general statute) authorized such taxation. As a result of this attempt to license, the case of
O·gden City vs. Boreman supra, came before the courts.
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In that case the defendant, Boreman, a duly licensed
attorney before the Supre1ne Court of the Territory was
charged 'vith practicing law in Ogden City without a
license as required by ordinance. The Justices court
found him guilty. Defendant appealed to the District
Court \Yhere he was found not guilty and discharged on
the ground that th·e ordinance under which the defendant
\Yas convicted was void so far as. it required a license
from Ogden City to :practice law.
The case was then taken to the Supreme Court to
test whet.her Ogden City had the power under the then
existing statutes to exact a license fee from an attorney
practicing in the City. The Supreme Court ruled that
the City did not have such authority. The rational of
that opinion is very important, however, in determining
the question now presented, as we believe the case can
be distinguished becaus·e of the rational and the legislative history of the present act, since that time.
I

In the Boreman case the Court held that ''where a
part of an act has been repealed, it must, although of no
operative force, still be taken in construing the rest.
The propriety of comparing repealed statutes with those
remaining in fo;rce, or subsequently enacted, for the purpose of construing the latter, is not to be questioned in
the ahs·ence of any reference to them in the statute under
consideration.'' Continuing the Court held, ''By repealing the clause providi:qg, for licensing and taxing lawyers,
and enacting the general clause referred to, leaving lawyers anrl the professions generally out of such reenact-
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ment, impels the conclusion that the legislature intended
to deprive the cities of the poweT to impose a license
fee or tax upon lawyers that they had for.merly possessed. There must have been an object and purpose
in this deliberate repeal in one section and omitting to
insert its provisions in the act as reenacted, having special refere~ce to licensi;ng and taxing in cities.. And
when Subdivisjon 87 is considered with reference to
Subdivision 38 and the repeal of 'Subdivision ·6 of Section
288, it is ·evident that it was not intended that lawyers
should be licensed or taxed under its provisions.''
To summarize, the Boreman case, supra, held that
the general licensing and taxing statute must be considered in pari materia with all the other taxing and
licensing statutes, and in view of the express legislative
·history of licensing statutes. The legislative intent was
found to be that lawyers shou1d not be taxed. The general statute was held to he limited to the more· specific
enumeration of persons and businesses that could be
licensed.
The case of Morgan vs. Salt Lake City discussed the
Boreman case at considerable length an~ gave a similar
summary of the c~se. However, that cas.e does not place
sufficient emphasis on the fact that a prior statute authorizing the taxing· of lawyers had been repealed and
the Court was gui<Jed strongly by the legislativ~e intent
thereby shown. The Court there again held that the,
specific enumeration in the present S·ection 15-8-39, limited the general powers conferred by Section 15-8-80.
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Ho,YeYer, the Morgan case did lay down a sp·ecific
interpretation of the \Yord business as used in 'Section
1;)-8-80. The Court there said:
-'What ordinarily is meant by the term "business"~ It is a pursuit or occupation. It denotes
the employment or occupation in which a person.
is engaged to procure a living. It is synonymous
with calling, occupation, or trade, and is defined
as any particular occupation or employment habitually engaged in for a livelihood or gain.''
ilforgan vs. Salt Lake City, supra.
With this general case law background, the ~present
statute, Section 15-8-80 was before the legislature in
1935. The legisl~ture at that time amended th,e statute
to specifically override the impact of the Boreman and
l\forgan cases, as far as requiring the reading of Section
15-8-39, or the enumerated p~ersons and businesses to be
taxed. The legislature in Chapter 24, .Laws of Utah,
1935, changed the statute to read as follows:
''They may -rais~e revenue by levying and collecting a license fee or tax on any busines~s within
the limits of the city, and regulate the same by
ordinance; provided, that no Utah city or town
shall collect a license fee or tax hereunder from
any solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains
orders for or sells goods in such city or town solely fo·r resft.le;and no enumeratvon of ·powers of
cities contained ~.n Title 15, Cha:pte.r 8, Revised
Statutes of Ut~ah, 1933, shall b.e deeme.d to limit
or restrict the general grant of authority hereby
conferred. All such license fees and taxes shall
be uniform in respect to the classes upon which
the~~ a f(l in1pos·erl. (Italics added.)
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·It will be noticed that both reasons for the Boreman
case ar.e now out of the present case. By specifically
giving cities a general grant of power, as above set out,
the legislature over-rides the implication that the general
. statute shall be limited ~eith·er to the specific statute or
to the legislative history adhered to in the Boreman case.
It appears therefore that the question before the
Court turns upon whether· the profession and lawyers
in particular, come within the classification of "business'' as defined in the Morgan case, supra. As above
set out, the definition as given by this Court is sufficiently broad to include the 'professions. Since in the ~on
sideration .of the Morgan cas~e the Court had discussed
the Boreman case and lawyers, it can very well be assumed that if the Court considered that the word "business'' did not embrace the professions and lawyers in
particular, the decision would not have placed such a
broad interpretation upon_the statute.
I~t

would s·eem that the interpretation of the statute
by this Court would carry the most weight in construing
this statute. However, even so, when we look to other
states we find sufficient authority to the effect that a
lawyer can be licensed under a general statute for licensing businesses. _
Lent vs. City of Portland, 42 Or. 488, 71 Pac.
. Pac. 64·5, 646.
/

In the case of Ex parte Galusha, 195 Pac. 406, the
California court in construing words contained in the
Los Angeles City Charter, ·empowering the city to li-
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cense and regulate '~any lawful business. or calling"
held to authorize the city to tax persons practicing law,
sinr.e the words ''Business'' and ''calling'' include persons following the professions., as well as those ·engaged
at work of a more purely commercial nature. In the
course of the opinion the Court said (p. 407):
'~Clearly

these terms include those following the professions as well as thos·e ~engaged in
work of a more purely commercial nature. It is
true that some cases seem to hold that, in dele~
gating the power to tax attorneys, a state must
specifically mention th·em (St. Louis vs. Laughlin,
49 ~Io. 559); on the other hand, it has been held
that where a city was authorized in general words
to tax 'all such callings, trades and employments
as the public good may require,' a tax might be
imposed on the occupation of attorney at law.
(Abram vs. City of Roseburg, 55 Or. 359, 105 Pa.c.
. 401, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 597).''
Continuing the Court said:
"In the absence of constitutional or statutory restrictions, there is no reason for making
a particular exception to the legal profession,
and where, as in the present case, the wording of
the charter is sufficiently broad to include other
professions in the delegation of the power to tax,
it must be held to embrace, the legal profession.''
With all due resp.ect to the splendid traditions of the
legal profession and the decisions of th·e courts with respect to the power of cities to subject me.mbers of the
profession to the p·rovisions of city ordinances levying
taxes for revenue, we are wondering if there is not a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
great deal to be said in favor o:f what the California
court said in the Galusha cas·e, supra: ''In the absence
of constitutional or statutory restrictions, there is no
reason for making a particular exception to the legal
profession." To the hiyman at least, it appears to be
a work of super-arrogation, when members of the legal
profession are heard to say and take the position that
they are outside the pale of the p·ower to tax for revenue
when it comes to subjecting them to the provisions of a
city ordinance,. calculated and intended to rais,e revenue
with which to defray the cost of city government and
compelling members of the profession, along with others,
to bear the~r part and portion and make their contribution thereto.
W·e ~earnestly submit that it is the duty of this
Honorable Court to re-examine the question, especially
in view of the trend of modern decisions) and the constantly changing conditions of society. It has become
common-place that what may have be~en good law in
one decade is not good law in another.
The taxing power of a city is general and extends
to all p·ersons, including lawyers.
Hay vs. Leonard, 46 SE 2d 653.
The following cases hold that lawyers can be licensed under the general powers conferred on cities:
I

In re: Kaffenbury, 101 N. Y. S. 501. Ex Parte
Galusha, supra.
The following cases have a bearing upon the ques-
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tion here pres·ented:
City of Coos Bay vs. Arie No. 538 of Fraternal
Order of Eagles et al. Supreme Court of
O·regon, 170 Pac. 2d 389 ; Garrett Freigh!t
Lines, Inc. vs. State Tax ComDlission et al,
13'5 Pac. 2d 523; Hill ·et al vs. City of
Eureka (California), 94 Pac. 2d 1025.
In summary, therefore, it can be said . that . the
amendment of the Utah statute in 193'5 by the legislature,
removed the rule of both the Boreman case, supra and
the Morgan case, supra from the picture. The gen·eral
g·rant of authority to license, tax and regulate all businesses within the City, we believe to be the intent of the
present law, unimpeded by the specific statute· or legislative history. We respectfully submit that the definition
of ''business'' as laid down in the Morgan case, supra, is
broad enough to include lawyers and th.e other profesSions.
1

All presumptions are in favor of the validity of the

tax.
Hay vs. Leonard, 46 S.E 2'd 653.
Unless the ordinance is invalid prohibition will not
lie.
McQuillin Municipal Corporations, Section
852, Note 55.

PROPOSITION NO. 2
Proposition No. 2, ''as to whether th·e practice of
law is subject to taxation for revenue, without any attempt at regulation.'' It is frankly admitted that the
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City is not attempting to regulate the p:r;actice of law or
attorneys, but is merely interested in raising r·evenue.
The City by the ordinance in question, does not attempt
to place-. additional require~nents or qualifications over
those. set by the State of Utah. There is nothing in the
ordinance which attempts or purports to be a regulation of the practice of law. It must he regarded as a
pure~y revenue measure as far as it effects attorneys at
law. Under the provisions of Section 15-8-80, Utah Code
Annotated, 19'43, the City has the power to impose license fees for revenue. Under what seems to be the great
weight of authority, the City may levy or impose a tax
for revenue, without attempting to regulate the activity
upon which the revenue tax is levied.
\

Ruckenbrod vs. Mullins, 102 Utah 548; 133
Pac. 2d 325; 144 A. L. R. 839.
All businesses may be licensed for rev·enue and the
State Bar Act does not preclude the city from imposing
the tax upon legal business.
State vs. Keller, 191 So. 542.; City vs. Railway, 142 Pac. 1067.

PROPOSITION NO. 3
Proposition No. 3, that the ordinance In question
is discriminatory would seem to be of little merit because it merely carries out the general plan of ta;xing
bnsinef;s, as suyh, and not the income or employee.
The terms used in the ordinanc~ are merely descriptive of what constitutes business and does not by
its terms exem:pt any particular class of business. An em-
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ployee is not engaged in business for himself, as the
tern1 business is commonly understood.
The purpos·e and intent of the ordinance is to levy
a license tax on the business.
A tax on a business based on gross receipts does not
apply to the employee. Therefore, the elimination of
the employees is not a discrimination.
Hay vs. Leonard, 46 SE 2d 653.

PROPOSITION NO. 4
Under this designation plaintiff says ''That the
city is without power to levy gross income taxes upon
its residents would seem almost to be accepted without
argument.'' ~This p·roposition may he readily conceded.
The objection is answered by the fact that the ordinance
in qu~stion is not, and is not int·ended to he C?nstrued as
an income tax.
We £eel that there can be no reasonable doubt that
this ordinance levies a fee for the p·rivilege of engaging
in business, occupation, trade or profession within the
corporate limits of Ogden City. There can be no re·asonable qoubt that the fee required to be paid is measured
by Twenty (20) cents per One Thousand $·(1,000.00)
Dollars of gross receipts, of all business, trade or profession or other activities. Th~ tax is on the business,
occupation, trade or profession. It is absurd, therefore,
to say that the ordinance imposes an income tax. It no
\vhere taxes income as such.
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COURT OF APPEAL:s. OF KENTUCKY,
City of Louisville, et al, Appellants vs. William Seh:r~·~, et al., Appellees.
. .,2I~ # -ZP/ .2 ¥-8 i 3 () +'"4/)/1 rijY()'
This ca'Se decided by the Court of Ap,peals of Kentucky on August ·6, 1948, decided and held that a Louisville ordinance was not an income tax but a tax upon the
p.rivilege of conducting a business within the city. The
Louis.ville ordinance had many more of th,e aspects of.
an income tax than the ordinance of Ogden City.

s

All businesses may be licensed for revenue and the
State Bar Act does not preclude the city from imposing
the tax upon the legal business. (State vs. Keller, 191
So. 542; City vs. Railway, 142 Pac. 1067.) Howeve:r, the
statute under which the tax is imposed requires that the
tax _must be uniform. Clas'Sification is permitted to
achieve uniformity. A tax on gross receipts of all business·es is the most uniform tax. The use of gross receipts in determining the amount of the tax is mer·ely
incidental to the tax to ·achieve uniformity. (City vs,
Railway, supra.) It does not convert the tax from an
occupation tax 'to an income tax.
·The ·power of taxation is a legislative function and
un1e·ss restrained by the constitp.tion the power vested
in the legislatur·e is supr;eme and not subject to review
by the courts. A tax imposed upon occupations is not
an income tax, but a tax on business. (Salt Lake City v.
Christensen, 9·5 Pac. 523; Newton vs. Atchinson, l Pac.
288.)
1
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PROPOSITION NO. 5
Proposition No. ·5 raises the question of what may
be termed separation of powers. i-"" e. The invasion by the
City of the Judiciary or the Judicial branch of the government. It is respectfully submitted that this objection
is more artificial than real, even though an attorn·ey is
in some respects an officer of the court.

By the ordinance in question, the City is not attempting to in any respect regulate, but only to rais-e
revenue. Each business or activity within the corporate
limits of the City should be required to bear its proportinate or corresponding share of th~e· burden of maintaining city government.

PROPOSITION NO. 6
The objection raised under Proposition No. 6 s-eems
to be that the licensing of an attorn·ey by the City limits,
or tends to limit, the right of clients to have an attorney
of their uwn choosing. This contention we believe to be
without merit in fact.
The canon of law i. e. the right to ·engage in the
practice bf law, has always been intended to be limited
to the proposition that such attorney must b-e. properly
qualified and licensed to practice within the locality.
This very specious argument should not be advanced by plaintiff as affording a loophole or means of
lawyers ·escaping taxation and avoiding their fair share
of the burden of supporting and maintaining his share
of the burden of city government, if otherwise lawfully
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subject to that responsibility, along with other business
men of the community.
The ~petition filed by the plaintiff is, what may be
termed a class suit. It does not seem that approximately
600 lawyers practicing in the State of Utah, could possibly he affected, unless they are engaged in a general
practice with a place of business in Ogden.
38 Am. Jurisprudcene, Page 46, Section 355·;
39 Am~ Jurisprudence, Page 921-2, Section
47-49.

We respectfully submit that the demurrer of the
defendants to the petition filed by the plaintiff should
he sustained and the Alte-rnative Writ of Prohibition
heretofore issue4 by the Court in this matter should be
vacated and set aside.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE S. BARKER,
City Attorney a.;nd
A tt1orney for Defevn&antB
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